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The near ubiquitous claim that Illinois is facing a “pension crisis” has rarely been challenged. The failure 
to examine this customary framing of the fiscal condition of Illinois’ five state pension systems limits how 
policymakers conceptualize their funding strategy. This white paper, jointly authored by researchers from 
the Project for Middle Class Renewal at the School of Labor and Employment Relations, the Government 
Finance Research Center and the Institute of Government and Public Affairs (all at the University of 
Illinois), argues that the “pension crisis” framework negatively influences discussions of policy options.  
 
Our goal with this paper is to rethink the conversation about pensions and the state’s finances in several 
ways. First, we argue that the funded ratio and unfunded liabilities, conventional ways of assessing a 
pension system’s fiscal health, are inadequate metrics that reinforce short-term thinking. We argue that the 
focus should be on long-term trends and peer comparison. In addition, attention should be paid to 
identifying what the drivers are of negative trends and carefully assessing whether action is needed.  
 
Second, we argue that a “pension crisis” is a situation in which the pension system is insolvent and unable 
to make benefit payments to current retirees. This is not the present scenario in Illinois. Nonetheless, we 
recognize that both the state and the pension systems face significant fiscal challenges. Third, rather than a 
singular problem, we contend that there are actually two, interrelated and in-conflict issues: 
 
● concern over the pension systems’ finances, and 
● operating budgets where expenses regularly exceed revenues.  
 
We note that a tension exists between a desire to rapidly improve the finances of the pension systems (which 
would necessitate higher state contributions), and an interest in preventing pension contributions from 
crowding out other areas of the state budget. 
 
Illinois lawmakers have long sought a silver bullet solution that will not increase (or even lower) the state’s 
required contributions while simultaneously shoring up the pension systems’ finances. We view such a 
scenario as unattainable and its pursuit as a distraction from the job of responsible policymaking. Moreover, 
because the two issues are interrelated, a policy designed to address one issue will necessarily worsen the 
other. 
 
In this paper, we recommend abandoning the “crisis” narrative and moving away from only assessing the 
pension systems’ finances with a single point-in-time measurement. Last, we urge lawmakers to shed the 
common practice of reducing the state’s pension payments to balance the operating budget. 
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By now it has become almost mandatory to 
describe Illinois as facing a “pension crisis” (e.g., 
Chicago Tribune, 2012; Davey and Walsh, 2015; 
USA Today, 2018). Only occasionally is there a 
word of protest to this substantive claim (Chicago 
Tribune, 2013). While this might seem, to some 
like an issue of semantics, we believe that the 
framing of Illinois’ pension problems is 
inextricably linked to how we conceptualize their 
solutions. The crisis narrative makes a broad 
claim about public pension systems writ large in 
Illinois. But Illinois has nearly 700 state and local 
pension funds, and their issues and challenges 
vary widely. This white paper focuses on just the 
five state systems,1 and challenges the pension 
crisis framework.  
In Illinois, discussions of a “pension crisis” are 
common, but an exact definition of that phrase is 
rarely offered. We argue that a “pension crisis” is 
a situation in which a pension system is insolvent 
(meaning its assets are depleted), and as a result 
benefit payments to current retirees are halted. 
Although that is not the current situation in 
Illinois, some are concerned that could happen 
because of the present state of the pension 
systems’ finances. While we are not dismissive of 
that concern, we argue that the pension crisis 
narrative is problematic because it obscures 
underlying issues and creates the unattainable 
expectation that the “crisis” must, and can be 
solved immediately.   
The phrase “pension crisis” is often invoked in 
discussions about the state’s current and future 
pension contributions, with many seeing those 
contributions as crowding out other aspects of the 
state’s budget. While recent cuts to other areas of 
state spending (like higher education and human 
services) are a concern, we argue that those cuts 
                                                 
1 The five state systems are: the Teachers’ Retirement System, the State Universities Retirement System (SURS), the State 
Employees’ Retirement System (SERS), the General Assembly Retirement System, and the Judges’ Retirement System. 
are not a pension crisis. Some tie the budget cuts 
to the state’s pension contributions; however, 
when faced with budget shortfalls lawmakers 
have a range of options, one of which is spending 
cuts. The state pension contributions in isolation 
do not lead to a direct decline in other areas of the 
budget.  
Our goal with this paper is to change the 
conversation about pensions and the state’s 
finances. We believe this is important for 
addressing the challenges facing 
the state in a calm, thoughtful and 
deliberate manner.  We need to 
understand the nature of the 
actual problems, the context in 
which they arose, and fully 
consider the consequences of 
alternatives. We aim to show that beneath the 
crisis narrative is actually two, interrelated and in-
conflict issues: (a) concern over the pension 
systems’ finances; and (b) operating budgets 
where expenses regularly exceed revenues. A 
tension exists between a desire to rapidly increase 
the finances of the pension systems (which would 
necessitate higher state contributions), and the 
concern that the state’s pension contributions are 
already crowding out other areas of the state’s 
budget. 
In addition, the crisis framework is harmful 
because it facilitates reactive policies that focus 
on short-term solutions and metrics. Illinois 
lawmakers have long sought a silver bullet 
solution that will simultaneously shore up the 
pension systems’ finances while not increasing 
the state’s required contributions (and in some 
instances even lowering the payments). In this 
paper, we recommend abandoning the “crisis” 
narrative and urge lawmakers to shed the common 
practice of reducing the state’s pension payments 
to balance the operating budget.  
“…beneath the 
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Fiscal sustainability of the pension systems and 
structurally balanced budgets are determined by 
political will and economic fundamentals. 
Governments can only raise revenue and control 
spending when political leaders are able to justify 
hard choices and gain their constituents’ trust and 
support. Political will requires that lawmakers 
understand the challenges that they face and 
explain them to voters in a way to garner their 
support for appropriate policies.  The more scarce 
economic resources are, the more difficult it is for 
elected leaders to devote resources to 
expenditures (like pension funding) that bring few 
immediate benefits to the vast majority of 
constituents. Better economic 
fundamentals (e.g. growing 
economic output and widely 
distributed economic gains) make 
it easier for lawmakers to garner 
political support for policies that 
increase fiscal burdens. 
We offer this white paper as a critique of the 
rarely challenged and ill-defined “crisis” 
narrative. We begin with conceptual critiques of 
the crisis framework. Next, we unpack the crisis 
framing to show how instead of a singular concern 
there are actually several, interrelated issues. 
Moreover, we show that these issues are in 
tension with one another. A fourth section 
provides three examples of how a “crisis bias” 
approach has largely failed to reduce unfunded 
liabilities and kept Illinois locked in a seemingly 
endless “pension crisis”. We conclude with 
recommendations about how to approach the 
state’s pension systems. 
II. WHY IS THE CRISIS FRAMEWORK 
BAD? 
The crisis framing was captured in a recent 
Crain’s Chicago Business piece that criticized 
newly sworn-in Governor J.B. Pritzker’s 
inaugural speech (Cahill, 2019). Cahill’s piece 
was headlined, “Pritzker’s pension silence speaks 
volumes”, and in it Cahill critiqued Governor 
Pritzker for having “nothing to say about $130 
billion in unfunded pension obligations to state 
employees, a yawning black hole of debt that 
threatens to swallow the state budget and 
suffocate Illinois’ economy” (Cahill, 2019). This 
crisis narrative implies that drastic action is 
needed to immediately extinguish $130 billion 
worth of debt. Such a framing incorrectly presents 
the issue as one that can be resolved in the short-
term and misunderstands the very nature of 
financial condition. 
One problem with the pension crisis narrative is 
that it creates a temporal mismatch between the 
framing of how the problem should 
be addressed and the actual nature 
of unfunded pension liabilities. 
This is because unfunded liabilities 
represent a long-term form of debt, 
and are not something that could be 
eliminated in a year (or even a few 
years). However, in the crisis framing, unfunded 
pension liabilities are often put in context of how 
much money is needed today to fully pay off the 
debt. A Bloomberg headline from last spring 
succinctly captures this misguided perspective: 
“Every Illinoisan Owes $11,000 for Pensions 
With No Fix in Sight” (Campbell, 2018). Stating 
how much every Illinoisan would need to pay 
today to wipe out unfunded liabilities in one year 
reinforces a short-term thinking that is 
disconnected from the nature of pension 
liabilities. It also ignores the fact that a pension 
system’s finances are in constant flux. Since 
assets and liabilities constantly change, the 
elimination of all unfunded liabilities today (even 
if possible) does not prevent unfunded liabilities 
from arising tomorrow.  
The short-term thinking of the crisis narrative also 
implies that there is an acute threat of benefits not 
being paid to retirees. A pension fund’s liabilities 
are the estimated cost of pension benefits being 
paid out now and benefits that will be paid out 
decades in the future. Unfunded liabilities are 
“…unfunded liabilities 
represent a long-term 
form of debt, and are not 
something that could be 
eliminated in a year” 
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liabilities that are currently not matched to assets. 
A pension system’s fundamental obligation is to 
pay claims to retirees and other claimants such as 
beneficiaries. As currently structured and funded 
Illinois’ pensions systems are not projected to go 
insolvent, meaning there is not an immediate risk 
that retirees will stop receiving their benefits. 
Unfunded liabilities are a form of long-term debt, 
and there is a plan in place to manage this debt. 
By the very design of this plan, the systems’ 
unfunded liabilities will continue to increase for 
the next decade and then start to decrease after 
2029. 
The crisis framework obscures that A) unfunded 
liabilities are a long-term debt to be paid off over 
decades, and B) Illinois has a payment schedule 
for its unfunded liabilities already in place. This 
is not, however, to say that the existing funding 
plan is perfect. The current funding plan is a back-
loaded debt repayment schedule in which 
unfunded liabilities increase for another decade 
before beginning to decrease. The structure of the 
funding plan also requires the state’s 
contributions to increase from year-to-year by an 
average of 3 percent under current projections. 
Last, future contributions could be much higher 
than current projections because actual 
contributions are determined each year and are 
impacted by changes in assumptions, investment 
performance, and the accuracy of actuaries’ 
assumptions. In Section 3 we discuss criticism of 
that funding plan and highlight budgetary 
challenges it creates.  
Another issue with the crisis framework is that it 
conceives of financial condition as a singular 
thing that can be “solved.” A pension fund’s fiscal 
health is often represented by one or two metrics, 
most commonly its unfunded liabilities or funded 
ratio (the ratio of pension assets to liabilities). A 
funded ratio of 100 percent means assets are 
sufficient to pay estimated current and future 
liabilities. While a funded ratio below 100 percent 
is often used as an indicator of a poorly financed 
system, there is no single threshold that 
distinguishes a healthy versus unhealthy 
retirement system (American Academy of 
Actuaries, 2012). More broadly, financial 
condition is multidimensional and cannot be 
assessed with one point of 
data at one point in time. 
Instead, financial 
condition is something to 
consistently monitor and 
attend to over time. The 
pension crisis framework 
simplifies the complexity 
of financial condition and gives the false 
impression that it is something to move on from 
once solved. 
Focusing on one metric also obscures legitimate 
debate concerning the optimal level of funding for 
a retirement system. A funded ratio target is 
commonly used in a funding policy that sets a 
government’s annual pension contribution. In 
many cases, a government’s required annual 
pension contribution equals the employer portion 
of the normal cost plus the expected cost to retire 
any unfunded liabilities. The “normal cost” is the 
cost of benefits earned that year by current 
employees. Employees’ contributions typically 
cover a portion of the normal cost, and the 
remainder is the employer’s share of the normal 
cost. The “expected cost to retire any unfunded 
liabilities” is determined by a combination of 
policy choices and actuarial assumptions. Policy 
choices include what is an acceptable level of debt 
(in the form of unfunded liabilities), how debt 
repayment should be structured, and over what 
time period all (or a portion) of unfunded 
liabilities should be paid. In Illinois, lawmakers 
enacted a plan that requires each state retirement 
system to achieve a 90 percent funded ratio by 
2045. Pension fund actuaries calculate the state’s 
required contributions each year to achieve that 
goal. 
Many observers advocate a funded ratio target of 
100 percent, and this is often treated as a 
fundamental principle in actuarial science but it is 
“Another issue with 
the crisis framework 
is that it conceives of 
a financial condition 
as a singular thing 
that can be ‘solved’” 
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not necessarily required by conventional 
economic theories of public finance and has little 
evidentiary support (e.g. Bohn, 2011). Economic 
analysis suggests that unfunded pension liabilities 
represent a governmental debt and should be no 
more, or less, privileged than any other debt.  
Public finance scholars and practitioners 
generally recommend incurring state or local 
government debt only for capital expenditures but 
not for operating expenditures such as 
compensation of current workers. This suggests 
that government ought to fully fund the normal 
cost of its pension obligation each year but says 
nothing about how unfunded pension liabilities 
should be retired. The rate at which debt acquired 
in the past should be retired is a political choice 
and a funded ratio of 90 percent or 100 percent or 
even 110 percent may represent a legitimate goal 
of the peoples’ elected representatives. 
While what level of unfunded 
liabilities is acceptable is 
debatable, focusing on just the 
funded ratio target misdirects 
attention away from the larger 
issue of funding discipline. 
Illinois exhibits a lack of 
funding discipline with a long 
legislative history of reducing the state’s pension 
contributions though pension holidays, changes to 
actuarial assumptions, tweaks to the funding 
policy and benefit reductions. Rather than focus 
on a funded ratio target in isolation, it is crucial to 
contextualize the target within the context of 
existing policies, and interrogate whether the goal 
of any proposed change is ultimately to reduce a 
government’s required pension contributions. The 
same level of scrutiny is needed for any proposed 
changes. Changing pension laws to cut required 
contributions shows a lack of funding discipline, 
and this has been a key issue in Illinois, as we 
highlight throughout this white paper. 
III. WHAT ARE THE UNDERLYING 
ISSUES? 
In addition to the conceptual flaws of the pension 
crisis framework, it has also been problematic 
because it masks what are actually two 
interrelated, yet conflicting issues: restoring the 
financial condition of the pension systems and 
alleviating budgetary pressure. We detail these 
two issues in the following subsections and 
highlight how the solution to one of the issues can 
exacerbate the other issue. Unfortunately, the 
crisis framework obscures these distinctions and 
leaves lawmakers searching for a silver bullet 
solution. 
a. Restoring the Retirement Systems’ Fiscal 
Health 
From one perspective, the central issue facing the 
State of Illinois is restoring the financial condition 
of the pension systems. While Illinois’ pension 
systems are able to pay out benefits to current 
retirees some are concerned that given their 
current finances and the state’s contribution 
history, this may not be the case in the future. This 
perspective highlights how the state’s history of 
insufficient contributions and lack of funding 
discipline have eroded the retirement systems’ 
finances over time. From this perspective, the 
optimal solution is getting the systems 100 
percent funded in the actuarially recommended 
time period of 20-30 years. Adopting such a 
funding target would require the state’s 
contributions to be much higher than they 
currently are, and those increased payments 
would exacerbate the state’s already existing 
fiscal challenges (which are discussed in 
subsection b).  
While the funded ratio in isolation tells us little, 
the funded ratio history provides meaningful 
insight into the finances of a pension system over 
time. Figure 1 shows the aggregate funded ratio 
“…focusing on just 
the funded ratio 
target misdirects 
attention away from 
the larger issue of 
funding discipline.” 
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for Illinois’ pension systems.2 The long-term 
downward trend in Illinois’ aggregate funded 
ratio is cause for concern. While the state pension 
systems have never been 100 percent funded, their 
aggregate funded ratio declined sharply in the 
wake of the 2007-2009 recession, falling from 63 
percent in 2007 to 39 percent in 2009, as shown 
in Figure 1. Since the aggregate funded ratio fell 
sharply in the wake of the recession it has 
generally remained around 40 percent. 
Illinois’ pension systems are also less funded than 
their peers. As of FY2018, Illinois’ five state 
                                                 
2 The funded ratios shown in Figure 1 for 1984-1994 are based on the cost method and 1995-2018 are based on the market 
value of assets. State law required that in fiscal year 2009, the actuarial value of assets be determined using a smoothing 
technique, and the state’s required pension contributions are determined using the actuarial value of assets. 
funds had a combined funded ratio of 40 percent, 
which is low in relation to other public pension 
systems in the United States. In 2017, the 
aggregate funded ratio for state and local pension 
funds in the United States was 72 percent 
according to the Center for Retirement Research 
(Aubry, Crawford and Wandrei, 2018). Illinois’ 
funded ratio puts it in the bottom third of 180 
plans examined by the Center for Retirement 
Research (CRR). In addition, CRR’s analysis 
finds that the gap between the systems with the 
highest and lowest levels of funding has been 
increasing over time. While the majority of state 
 























Funded Ratio History of Illinois' Five State Retirement Funds
Source: 2018 is from the Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability (COGFA) November 2018 
Special Pension Briefing; 2008-2017 are from COGFA’s annual pension reports; 2004-2007 are COGFA’s fiscal year 
2008 pension report; 1996-2003 from COGFA’s January 2006 “Report on the 90% Funding Target of Public Act      
88-0593”; 1995 from the Illinois Comptroller’s May 2011 Fiscal Focus; and, 1984-1994 from Blair, 1996.
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and local pension systems have funded ratios 
below 100 percent, Illinois stands out as having 
pension funds that are significantly less funded 
than others. 
Boosting a pension fund’s finances requires 
decreasing liabilities (e.g. cutting retirement 
benefits), increasing assets, or a combination of 
the two. The majority (65 percent) of the 
aggregate liability for Illinois’ state pension 
systems is associated with current retirees.3 
Illinois’ state constitution has a provision that 
prohibits cutting retirement benefits for current 
employees and retirees (i.e., Illinois Constitution, 
Article XIII, Section 5). The meaning of that 
provision was tested in recent years when state 
lawmakers passed two different pieces of 
legislation that cut pension benefits for current 
employees and retirees.4  
Both pieces of legislation were found to be 
unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court. 
The court interpreted the constitutional provision 
to require that once an employee is hired under a 
particular public pension plan they are entitled to 
remain within that plan and to accrue benefits 
under the plan provisions that were in place once 
they joined the retirement system for the 
remainder of their work life (In re Pension Reform 
Litigation, 2015; Jones v. Municipal Employees’ 
Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2016). 
These rulings suggest that it is extremely unlikely 
that the Illinois Supreme Court will allow any 
diminution of pension benefits for current 
employees or retirees. Additionally, near term 
benefit cuts seem politically unlikely given 
comments by newly sworn-in Governor Pritzker 
(Bryne and Ruthhart, 2018). 
Another way to improve the pension funds’ 
finances is by increasing assets, and a main way 
to do that is via employer contributions. A 
                                                 
3 The 65 percent figure was calculated by the authors, using the liability data in each of the five retirement systems’ 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports for 2017.  
4 The relevant laws were Public Act 98-599, which impacted the state retirement systems (except for the Judges’ Retirement 
System), and Public Act 98-641, which impacted Chicago’s municipal and labor pension funds. 
longstanding issue, however, has been the state’s 
lack of funding discipline and low contributions. 
The Teachers’ Retirement System’s (TRS) 
Executive Director, Dick Ingram, captures this 
perspective in TRS’ summer 2018 newsletter, and 
links concern over the pension fund’s fiscal health 
explicitly to the state’s contributions. He writes 
that there “are no signs that [TRS’] funded status 
is going to improve in the near future, especially 
when state government keeps reducing its annual 
contribution to TRS” (2018). In other words, TRS 
is concerned about its current financial condition 
as well as further deterioration if lawmakers 
reduce state pension contributions. 
Illinois has historically made contributions that 
are insufficient to maintain or decrease unfunded 
liabilities from year-to-year. Between 1996 and 
2018, Illinois’ unfunded liabilities increased by 
$115 billion. Figure 2 shows that insufficient state 
contributions were the largest factor in that 
growth while changes in actuarial assumptions 
was the second largest factor. Other factors 
include retirement systems’ investment gains 
being less than predicted by actuaries and 
variance between actuarial assumptions and 
actual experience concerning things like 
retirement rates, disability rates, and mortality 
rates. Benefit increases account for only a small 
portion of the growth in unfunded liabilities, and 
salary increases were smaller than assumed by 
actuaries and thus decreased unfunded liabilities 
relative to projections. 
From this view, and as highlighted by Figure 2, 
insufficient state contributions are a main reason 
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A second concern is the state’s funding policy, 
which is perceived as inadequate for restoring the 
health of the retirement systems’ finances. The 
Teachers’ Retirement System succinctly captures 
this position in its 2017 Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Report:  
Since TRS was founded in 1939, the State 
of Illinois has never, in any year, funded 
the System at a level that standard 
actuarial practice would define as 
sufficient (2017, p. 7).  
Under current law the state’s annual pension 
contributions must be sufficient to bring each 
pension fund to a 90 percent funded ratio by the 
end of FY2045. Under the state law’s design, the 
pension funds will always have some amount of 
unfunded liabilities. The state’s funding laws 
differ from actuarial standards, which require a 
funded ratio target of 100 percent and amortizing 
unfunded liabilities over a period of 20-30 years.  
The difference between Illinois’ funding policy 
and actuarial best practice is cited as a continuing 
issue for some. Each year the pension funds have 
to certify the statutorily required annual state 
payment to the retirement systems. In 2012, TRS’ 
Board of Trustees passed a resolution that 
actuarial principles and standards would be used 
to determine future certifications of the state’s 
required contribution. As a result, in its 
certification letters, TRS includes both the 
actuarial recommendation for the state’s pension 
contribution and the (lower) payment required by 
state law. TRS’ explicit purpose for including the 
actuarial recommendation is to “illustrate the gap 
between sound funding policy and current 
practice” (Teachers’ Retirement System, 2017 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, 2017). 
Figure 3 compares the state’s actual contributions 
to TRS’ recommended contributions for years 
2017 through 2020.  








































Change in Aggregate Unfunded Liabilities for Illinois' State Pension Funds
Source: Illinois Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability, November 2017, p. 7 at http://cgfa.ilga.gov
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TRS’s recommended state contributions for 2017-
2020 would be $10.4 billion more than the 
payments required by state law. From TRS’ 
perspective, this gap between the state’s payments 
under current law and the contributions the state 
would pay in accordance with actuarial best 
practices is an issue. From this perspective, the 
main issues are the state’s lack of funding 
discipline and an inadequate funding plan. 
b. Pension Payment in Context of the State 
Budget 
While TRS sees the state’s pension 
contributions under current law as 
deficient, a contrasting viewpoint is 
that the payments are already too 
high and are crowding out other 
aspects of the state budget. Governor 
Rauner’s FY2019 proposed 
operating budget expressed this 
view:  
The funding of public 
pensions has been, and 
continues to be, Illinois’ most 
challenging fiscal concern. 
Over the last decade, the 
state’s pension costs have grown far 
faster than its revenues, putting 
pressure on the rest of the state 
budget and leading to structural 
deficits… high pension costs siphon 
public funds that deliver actual 
public services used by 
taxpayers…the state's expenditure 
on pensions have steadily risen over 
the years. Meanwhile, expenditure 
on all other services, such as health 
care and education, has stagnated… 
(Illinois State Proposed FY19 
Operating Budget). 
While Illinois does face fiscal 
challenges, this is a separate (but 
related) issue to the pension systems’ finances and 
concern of their potential insolvency. While we 
argue that the state faces budgetary pressures, the 
pension contributions are not the only source.  
Statements like former Governor Rauner’s are 
often bolstered by graphs like Figure 4 that show 
the share of the state’s General Funds 
expenditures on pension contributions rising to 
very high levels over the past few decades. 
There has been a general upward trend in the 
state’s annual pension contributions as a share of 
FY2020 State Funding Requirement. 
Figure 3: Comparison of TRS’ Recommended State Contribution vs. State 
Contribution Required Under State Law ($ Billions) 













TRS' Recommended vs Actual State Contribution
State Contribution per State Law TRS Recommended State Contribution
Source: Figures for 2017-2019 from the Commission on Government Forecasting and 
Accountability’s March 2016, March 2017, and March 2018 Financial Condition of the Illinois 
State Retirement Systems reports; 2020 from the Teachers’ Retirement System’s Preliminary 
Certification of TRS FY2020 State Funding Requirement. 
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General Funds and, in recent years, it has been 
more than 20 percent.   
We argue however, that only 
looking at General Funds gives 
an incomplete picture. This is 
because the state’s General Funds are merely one 
portion of Illinois’ spending (about 46 percent in 
2018). In addition, what is in the General Funds 
category has changed over time. For example, two 
new special state funds were created in 2015, and 
income tax revenue that previously was deposited 
into the General Fund was instead deposited into 
those funds.5 Expenditures from those two funds, 
however, were for the same spending (education 
and human services) that had previously occurred 
via the General Funds. With the creation of the 
new funds, an accurate assessment of spending on 
those programs requires comparing General 
Funds spending prior to 2015 with General Funds 
                                                 
5 The specific funds are the Advancement of Education and the Commitment to Human Services Fund. 
plus the special revenue funds spending today. In 
addition, monies from non-General 
Funds have periodically been swept 
and/or borrowed as non-recurring 
revenue sources for the General Funds. 
[See box on page 14 titled, General 
Funds Versus All Funds for further discussion.] 
Figure 5 adds pension spending as a share of “all 
funds” spending to the graph above, where “all 
funds” spending includes a variety of items not 
included in General Funds (like transportation 
spending), but also significant portions of 
spending for education, human services, public 
health and safety and other categories (Dye, 
Merriman and Hudspeth 2011). 
When all funds are examined there is still a 
general upward trend in pension spending (as 
shown in Figure 5), but the peak is about ten 
percent and the line slopes upward somewhat 
Figure 5: Pension share of expenditures – All funds and General Funds 
“…only looking at 
General Funds gives an 
incomplete picture.” 
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more gently compared to pension contributions as 
a share of General Funds. 
The point here is that, regardless of whether 
General or all funds are used as the denominator, 
recent Illinois budgets have accommodated large 
shares of pension spending. Many analyses 
suggest that Illinois faces a persistent structural 
budget imbalance (Illinois State Proposed FY19 
Operating Budget, 2019) and will need to make 
changes in spending and/or revenues to become 
fiscally sustainable. Careful analyses suggest that 
necessary policy changes will take years of fiscal 
discipline across a broad range of policies 
(Merriman, David, Chuanyi Guo and Di Qiao, 
2018).  
In November 2018 the Commission on 
Government Forecasting and Accountability 
(COGFA) published the most recent estimates of 
the state’s annual pension contributions through 
2045 (Bae and Versweyveld, 2018). This 
publication gives the best current estimates of the 
required future state payments to bring the five 
pension systems to a 90 percent level of funding 
by 2045. Between 2019 and 2045, annual 
payments are projected to rise from $8.5 billion to 
$19.1 billion.  
Is the pension contribution schedule fiscally 
sustainable? While many would look at the 
estimated 2045 payment and reflexively answer 
no, we argue the future pension projections need 
to be examined in conjunction with estimates 
about future economic and budgetary conditions.  
Any claim that a particular level of spending on a 
government good or service is “not sustainable” 
Figure 6: Change in nominal Illinois gross domestic product 
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implicitly asserts that elected officials cannot or 
will not be able to retain office if they support 
such an expenditure. We know of no analytical 
method or evidence base that allows us to directly 
determine whether any level of pension spending 
is “fiscally sustainable” because we do not know 
how to determine what level of expenditures or 
taxation constituents will support. However, we 
can bring evidence to bear on the economic and 
budgetary burden that projected increases in 
future pension payments may impose. 
The broadest measure of a state’s capacity to fund 
public service is the total economic output it 
produces which is commonly measured by a 
state’s gross domestic product or GDP. As shown 
in Figure 6, Illinois’ GDP like that of the U.S. as 
a whole and particularly like other states in the 
Midwest, has been volatile but nevertheless 
averaged nominal growth of almost 3.5 percent 
over the 20 year period from 1997 to 2017. 
Figure 7 provides some evidence about how much 
growing state pension contributions will burden 
the Illinois economy if GDP continues to grow at 
historical rates. 
Figure 7 shows that the state’s annual pension 
contributions reached nearly one percent of 
Illinois GDP in 2018.  If future Illinois GDP 
growth is similar to growth over the past 20 years 
and if pension contributions increase in-line with 
the current actuarial projections, then the state’s 
annual pension payments will stabilize at about 
one percent of state GDP over the next several 
decades. 
In terms of future budgetary conditions, we 
examine the share of future General Funds and all 
Figure 7 Historical and projected Illinois pension spending as a share of GDP 
A “Pension Crisis” Mentality won’t Help  13 
 
funds spending that will be consumed by the 
state’s future pension contributions should current 
trends in spending continue.  Figure 8 extends 
Figure 5 to show the expected future shares of 
state spending going to pensions assuming that 
pension spending grows as forecast by the 
retirement systems and General Funds and all 
funds spending grow at their historical (1998 to 
2018) respective nominal growth rates of 3.0 and 
4.5 percent. 
Figure 8 shows that, under current law and current 
actuarial assumptions the share of state spending 
on annual pension contributions peaked in recent 
years and is expected to be stable or declining 
over the next several decades. Of course, whether 
this scenario is sustainable or acceptable depends 
upon whether one sees the current budgetary 
allocation as tolerable.   
Illinois’ current fiscal situation is almost 
universally viewed as perilous. Its bond rating, 
which determines the interest rate at which it can 
borrow, is the lowest of any state in the nation, an 
indication of the widely held view of Illinois as 
fiscally troubled.  
Importantly, Illinois’ pension contributions are 
not the sole source of its fiscal stress. The state 
went two years without a formal budget, which 
created several fiscal pressures. During that two-
year period significant cuts were made to areas of 
the budget like human services and funding for 
higher education, and there has been a push to 
reverse those cuts and restore spending to at least 
prior levels. In addition, during the budget 
impasse the state incurred a large amount of 
unpaid bills, which are subject to interest penalty 
payments. Between January and November 2018, 
Figure 8: Historical and projected Illinois pension spending as a share of spending 
A “Pension Crisis” Mentality won’t Help  14 
 
the state paid more than $600 million in interest 
penalties (State of Illinois Comptroller, 2018). 
The state continues to pay down outstanding bills, 
but as of mid-January 2019, backlogged bills 
totaled $8.1 billion (State of Illinois Comptroller, 
2019). Other budgetary pressures include back 
pay owed to state workers (Finke, 2018; 
Buchman, 2019) and increasing state spending on 
K-12 education to meet the Illinois State Board of 
Education’s recommended level of funding.6 
                                                 
6 On January 15 Pritzker signed an order to begin paying step increases to more than 20,000 state employees. The step 
increases had been halted by former Governor Rauner after the contract between the state and the American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees, the union that represents about 38,000 state workers, expired in 2015. However, a 
state appeals court had ruled that the Rauner administration was wrong when it stopped awarding the increases. The source 
of the revenue to make the payments was not immediately identified.  
Pension contributions under current law 
constitute an important part of the state’s overall 
budget. Given that and the other budgetary 
pressures already facing Illinois, it is clear that 
dramatically increasing the payments to a level 
like TRS’s recommendation, which would require 
a near doubling of the contributions, is not 
feasible absent significant increases in revenue 
and/or cuts to other areas of the budget. Even 
absent changing the state’s pension funding 
policy, some adjustments to spending and/or 
General Funds Versus All Funds 
Revenues received and expended by Illinois state government are deposited into, or drawn 
from one of more than 700 funds. The use of “fund accounting” is a common practice in 
state governments and is intended to assure accountability and, in some cases, to facilitate 
earmarking so that revenues raised for a particular purpose are spent only on designated 
functions (e.g. state lottery revenues may be expended only for education finance in some 
cases). Major categories of funds in Illinois include 1) General Funds 2) Special State funds 
3) Highway Funds 4) Trust Funds, etc.  There are currently six funds that compose the 
Illinois General Funds. These six funds receive revenue from a variety of sources, make 
expenditures on a variety of government goods and services and frequently are the 
recipients or source of large transfers to, or from, funds that are not included in the General 
Funds. The decision about whether to include a revenue or expenditure in the General 
Funds is determined legislatively and is not governed by any accounting rule or principle. 
The inclusion of particular categories of revenues or expenditures within the General Funds 
varies from year to year. Because of this, trends in general fund spending or revenue are 
difficult to clearly interpret and can be misleading (Dye, Merriman and Hudspeth, 2011). 
 
Despite this, many analytical reports focus attention almost exclusively on activity within 
Illinois’ General Funds (Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability 2017; 
Civic Federation, 2018). Both the US Census and the Fiscal Futures Project have developed 
broader budgetary concepts that are designed to capture government revenue from, and 
spending on, all state functions (Dye, 2016; K Pierson, 2015).  
 
These data sources are comparable across states and over time, while looking only at 
General Funds totals may be misleading.  In this white paper we use Fiscal Futures (rather 
than Census) measures of “all funds” spending since Fiscal Futures data is more up-to-date.  
Analyses using Census’ measures of “general expenditures” would likely yield similar 
insights to those gained from the Fiscal Futures “all funds” expenditure measure used here. 
A “Pension Crisis” Mentality won’t Help  15 
 
revenue may be required. This is because some 
analyses show that Illinois has a large structural 
imbalance with expenditures under current law 
and practice greater than revenues under current 
law and practice (Merriman, Guo and Di Qiao, 
2018). If these analyses are correct Illinois will 
have to make some adjustments, but nothing in 
the analyses suggests that pension spending 
should be singled out for more, or less, scrutiny 
than other categories of spending.  
In order to manage its fiscal challenges in the most 
productive manner Illinois should act deliberately 
with forethought and long-term planning. 
Whenever proposals that claim to solve the 
“pension crisis” crop up they should be 
scrutinized to identify what the actual goals are. Is 
the goal to improve the financial condition of the 
pension systems in a shorter 
timeframe than the current funding 
plan? Or is the ultimate goal to create 
short-term budgetary relief? 
Unfortunately, as we illustrate in the 
next section, the rhetoric of crisis 
often impedes clear-eyed, holistic 
analyses and inhibits sound decision-
making. 
IV. THE PENSION “CRISIS BIAS” 
Assuming a “pension crisis” narrative has costs 
that are evident in Illinois’ legislative history. Not 
only in how it impacts the finances of the pension 
systems but also in the way it predetermines 
approaches to the subject. As Section III 
highlighted there are two main issues that are 
interrelated, yet in-conflict: (1) the financial 
condition of the pension funds, and (2) the state’s 
annual pension contributions as burdensome for 
the state budget. Importantly, in moments of 
political pressure to do something about pensions, 
what often materializes is legislation that 
alleviates the short-term pressure with the 
                                                 
7 Importantly that legislation also increased pension benefits. 
creation of a future, long-term problem. As a 
result, Illinois is stuck in a seemingly endless 
cycle of pension crises and problematic 
legislation.  In this section, we highlight three 
examples in which Illinois lawmakers have taken 
a “crisis” orientation to pension solvency and the 
state’s annual pension contributions. We use these 
examples to show how this crisis mentality leads 
lawmakers to attempt the impossible: improve the 
finances of the retirement systems without 
increasing (or even lowering) the state’s annual 
contributions. 
Take for example, the "Pension Ramp." In 1994 
Governor Edgar signed into law a funding plan to 
improve the financial condition of the state's 
retirement systems over 50 years. At the time, the 
state pension funds had $17 billion in unfunded 
liabilities and an aggregate funded 
ratio of 54.5 percent. The plan was 
designed to ameliorate a long-
standing and growing problem of 
having inadequate financial 
provisions in the state pension funds 
to pay future retirees, but importantly 
did so without dramatically increasing 
the state’s annual pension contributions in the 
short term and putting off paying down unfunded 
liabilities for decades.  
Moreover, the Pension Ramp reduced the state’s 
contributions from what they would have been 
under a previous funding law enacted in 1989, 
Public Act 86-273.7 Under that law, the state’s 
contributions were supposed to increase steadily 
for seven years and then the state was supposed to 
begin paying down unfunded pension liabilities 
starting in FY1996. However, lawmakers failed to 
make the payments required by that seven year 
ramp. Rather than simply sticking to the existing 
funding plan, lawmakers elected in 1994 to create 
a new one (the Pension Ramp). Importantly, had 
lawmakers kept the old funding law (Public Act 
86-273), the state’s contribution to TRS in 
“…the rhetoric of 
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FY1996 would have been nearly $400 million 
more than it was under the Pension Ramp 
(Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of 
Illinois, Actuarial Valuation, 1993; Teachers’ 
Retirement System, 1996). Even though the new 
Pension Ramp reduced the state’s contributions 
and pushed off paying down unfunded liabilities 
into the future, the governor confidently claimed, 
"We had a time bomb in our retirement system 
that was going to go off sometime in the first part 
of the 21st Century. This legislation defuses that 
time bomb" (Pearson, 1994).  
Despite such positive proclamations, the plan was 
flawed from the outset. The scheduled payments 
for the first 15 years (FY1996-FY2010) were a 
ramp period (replacing the previously existing 
ramp). During the ramp period, the state’s 
contributions increased incrementally from year-
to-year, but were not directly based on the cost of 
benefits earned or existing unfunded liabilities. 
Moreover, by its very design, the Pension Ramp 
grew unfunded liabilities for years before ever 
before ever beginning to pay them down. 
In March 2013, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission charged that the pension ramp was 
the "primary driver" of Illinois' unfunded pension 
liability because its insufficient investments in the 
first 15 years merely shifted "costs to the future 
and, as a result, created significant financial stress 
and risks for the state" (Zorn, 2016).  In hindsight, 
the plan appears badly misguided but at the time 
many observers were no doubt persuaded to act 
because they, like the Illinois Pension Laws 
Commission, had concluded the problem was 
"moving toward crisis" (Zorn, 2016). 
A crisis mind-set also fathered a second example. 
Faced in 2003 with over $40 billion in unfunded 
pension obligations and a pressing budget deficit 
                                                 
8 As of 2017, the pension funds’ annualized investment returns have exceeded the 5.07 percent interest rate Illinois paid to 
borrow the $10 billion (Illinois State Retirement Systems: Financial Condition as of June 30, 2017, 2018; Hinz, 2014). It is 
important to note that the bonds are still outstanding and will not be retired until FY2033, at which point it will be possible 
to determine whether the arbitrage worked. 
 
when the governor signed off on the sale of $10 
billion of pension obligation bonds. The plan 
authorized Illinois to issue general obligation 
bonds and give the proceeds of the issuance to the 
pension systems. Doing so would immediately 
increase the pension systems’ assets, in-turn 
decreasing unfunded liabilities. In addition, the 
retirement systems would invest the proceeds in 
the financial markets, with the goal that the 
investment performance would exceed the 
interest payments on the bonds. In executing this 
plan the state was betting that the retirement 
systems’ investments would outperform the cost 
of the bonds, creating overall lower costs for the 
state in the long run.8  
Driving the bond sale were dire predictions of 
pension systems that were on “life support” 
(Schneyer, 2003). Adding to the General 
Assembly’s financial worries was an expected 
five billion dollar state budget deficit. In the 
previous year, the budget director graphically 
warned that the budget was “probably going to be 
the bloodiest budget that the state has seen 
introduced since 1992" (Finke, 2002).  
A major shortcoming of the plan was that not all 
of the bond proceeds were used to pay down 
unfunded pension liabilities. Instead, a portion 
was used to plug budget deficits. Of the $10 
billion borrowed, only $7.3 billion was used to 
reduce the unfunded liabilities of the retirement 
systems. The remaining $2.3 billion was used to 
pay part of the regular state contributions to the 
retirement systems for 2003 and all of the 2004 
required contributions. Instead of supplementing 
the required payments, the $2.3 billion replaced 
payments that would otherwise have come from 
general tax revenue (Civic Federation, 2018). 
Using a portion of the $10 billion bond for 
operating expenses indicates that the state’s 
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budget was out of balance. Using debt proceeds to 
fill an operating budget shortfall allowed the state 
to pay for other areas of the budget without raising 
taxes. While this resolved the budget challenges 
for a short period of time, it did not lead to a long-
term resolution because the state’s pension 
contributions are on-going and the bond issuance 
was not a recurring revenue source.  
A third case of crisis decision-making is the 
state’s 2010 pension legislation. In the wake of 
the Great Recession, the financial condition of the 
pension systems decreased significantly and 
unfunded liabilities increased. Under the design 
of the Pension Ramp, the 15-year ramp ended in 
FY2010 and FY2011 was going to be the first year 
in which the state’s annual pension contributions 
were directly tied to unfunded liabilities. 
Specifically, for FY2011-FY2045 the state’s 
contributions have to be sufficient so each fund 
reaches a 90 percent funded ratio at the end of 
FY2045. Since the pension funds’ unfunded 
liabilities sharply increased in the wake of the 
Great Recession this meant that the state’s 
contributions in the second phase of the Pension 
Ramp would be higher than previously predicted. 
Confronting frantic warnings of a ''financial 
implosion,'' lawmakers passed sweeping 
legislation that created a second, lower level of 
pension benefits for all state and local pensions 
(known as Tier II). Employees hired on or after 
January 1, 2011 became Tier II pension 
participants with much less generous retirement 
benefits than state employees hired prior to the 
law going into effect, now known as Tier I 
participants. The move was projected to lower the 
state's contributions over the following three 
decades by more than $70 billion and cut total 
pension liabilities nearly in half, by $256 billion 
(Grotto and Long, 2011).  
However, the new law created several problems. 
The benefit differences between the two tiers are 
substantial. For those in the Teachers’ Retirement 
System, Tier I members’ pension costs are 
roughly 20 percent of an active member’s salary. 
But a Tier II member’s pension is worth just seven 
percent of an active member’s salary (Ingram, 
2015). Over a career, pension benefits of Tier II 
TRS participants would be hundreds of thousands 
of dollars less than a similar Tier I worker. This is 
true despite the fact that active Tier II members 
pay the same 9.4 percent salary contribution to the 
system that active Tier I members pay.  A Tier II 
TRS member’s employee pension contribution 
pays the entire cost of his or her pension plus an 
extra 2.4 percent. That extra 2.4 percent 
subsidizes the pensions of Tier I members 
(Ingram, 2015). 
There is also a potentially serious and costly flaw 
in the Tier II plan. If the rate of inflation is high 
enough, Tier II benefits will be so low that they 
will violate federal law, which requires that they 
be at least equivalent to social security benefits. 
Consequently, Illinois could be required to 
increase the benefit of approximately 78 percent 
of the employees not currently enrolled in Social 
Security (State of Illinois Report of the Pension 
Modernization Task Force, House Joint 
Resolution 65, 2009). 
The “crisis” framework led lawmakers to create 
Tier II without much consideration of its potential 
pitfalls. A belief that something needed to be done 
in the present led to too little time and 
consideration of the future implications of what 
was being implemented. The Tier II plan passed 
through both state chambers in a single day. 
Lawmakers never saw detailed projections from 
pension system actuaries of the plan’s impact. 
Sara Wetmore, vice president and research 
director at The Civic Federation, pointed out 
“They passed this so quickly that there really 
wasn’t any way for anybody to know if there 
would be any problems in the future” 
(Mathewson, 2016). A few short years after its 
creation, the problems of Tier II are widely 
acknowledged (Secter and Geiger, 2015). 
This crisis mind-set is illustrated by the 2015 
debate on yet another potential pension “fix” 
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(called SB1) that would have pushed Tier I 
pension members into Tier II. It was pointed out 
during debate over that legislation that such a 
change could lead to still more state workers 
having pension benefits that were less than social 
security and therefore violating federal law. The 
legislative point person’s response to this concern 
was that the potential shortfall of Tier II benefits 
was “an issue that’s not immediate - probably 10-
12 years down the road - and could be addressed 
later. It shouldn’t stand in the way of a real 
solution” (Capitol Fax, 2013). 
The Daily Herald headline “Seeking Solutions to 
the Pension Crisis: Reducing Benefits, Raising 
Taxes Among the Proposals,” represents a 
common narrative for how opinion leaders, 
elected officials and residents have 
conceptualized the state’s pension systems 
(McCoppin, 2010). But it has not well served the 
state. Crisis thinking has produced short-term 
adjustments that have satisfied political needs and 
reduced the state’s required 
contributions, created the 
illusion of problem-solving, 
provided political cover for 
elected leaders, aggravated 
material conditions and 
forestalled development of 
effective ideas to strengthen the financial 
condition of Illinois’ retirement systems. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Illinois has not designed a strategic approach to 
funding its pensions systems. Addressing the need 
to appropriately fund the pension systems has 
focused largely on ratios, unfunded liabilities and 
budgetary impacts. Policy debates and outcomes 
on pensions have occurred inextricably with 
concerns about state spending and revenue. The 
history of lawmaker attention to the state’s 
retirement systems has featured a series of 
misfired measures that at the time were claimed 
by many to have resolved the crisis. 
As we have discussed, the crisis mentality is 
problematic and conceals what are actually two 
conflicting and interrelated issues. The state has 
long had a lack of funding discipline, which has 
contributed to the deterioration of the pension 
funds’ finances. Some see the state’s funded ratio 
target of 90 percent as emblematic of that issue, 
and the ultimate resolution from that perspective 
is for the state’s annual pension payments to be in 
accordance with actuarial best practices. Such 
action would require dramatically increasing the 
state’s contributions, which would exacerbate the 
state’s already existing fiscal issues. Some state 
elected leaders see the problem as the pension 
systems demanding an increasing share of 
revenues that crowd out other funding needs, and 
many see the pension contributions under current 
law as already burdensome. Those focused on the 
pension contributions as a budgetary issue seek a 
solution that would reduce the state’s annual 
pension contributions. 
In this white paper we offer two additional 
perspectives. First, as we have noted, the current 
funded ratio matters only insofar as it hampers a 
pension fund’s ability to meet its obligation to pay 
benefits now and in the future. A pension 
system’s funded ratio should not be viewed in 
isolation but should be viewed in the context of 
the overall credibility of the commitment to make 
the necessary contributions. In assessing the 
finances of a pension system, rather than looking 
at just the current year’s funded ratio in isolation, 
it is important to examine the funded ratio history 
and compare it to other systems. Second, whether 
lawmakers see current projections of the state’s 
pension contributions as feasible and how they 
respond to budgetary challenges as they arise are 
largely determined by political will, rather than 
some objective metric of financial feasibility. The 
state’s pension contributions are one aspect of the 
state’s budget, but too often lawmakers have 
chosen to remedy budget deficits by reducing the 
state’s required pension contributions. Such 
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action creates short-term budgetary relief, while 
worsening the pension systems’ finances. 
In 1970 Illinois demonstrated an almost ironclad 
political will to guarantee pension 
benefits by including a constitutional 
provision that explicitly required that 
pension benefits “shall not be 
diminished or impaired”. While we 
have argued above that there is no 
fundamental economic principle that 
requires pensions to be 100 percent (or 
90 or 120 percent) funded we are 
mindful that policymakers often lower 
funded ratio targets for the sole purpose of 
reducing required contributions, and as such (and 
given Illinois’ history) we do not advocate 
lowering the target for the state’s funding policy. 
Statutory goals (and plans) are tangible 
manifestations of political will and increase the 
probability that pension funds will remain solvent 
throughout the life of those enrolled in the system. 
Other demonstrations of political commitment 
could include earmarking of certain revenues 
exclusively for pension funding. Such 
demonstrations of political will are designed to 
strengthen the resolve of future lawmakers who 
may want to defer pension funding. These 
mechanisms also are designed to encourage the 
loyalty of employees. 
Attracting and retaining talented public servants 
is critical to providing services to Illinois 
residents and to the state’s functioning order. We 
recommend therefore that policymakers properly 
understand pension contributions in the context of 
budgetary spending and the state’s gross domestic 
product.  
Most importantly, we further strongly encourage 
lawmakers to resist the siren cries of a “pension 
crisis” fix.  Political and public pressure on the 
new administration to do something - anything - 
quickly will create fertile grounds for pension 
fixes to flourish.  But if history is any guide, it will 
also likely lead to bad or insufficient outcomes. At 
a minimum Illinois should rid itself of its “pension 
crisis” outlook.  Only then can thoughtful 
decision-making occur which can generate 
effective and long-term strategies for funding the 
state pension system and determining 













resist the siren 
cries of a ‘pension 
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